Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/191028 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Verlag: 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
How do near-zero deposit rates affect (optimal) bank capital regulation and risk taking? I study these questions in a tractable, dynamic equilibrium model, in which forward-looking banks compete imperfectly for deposit funding, subject to a (zero) lower bound constraint on deposit rates (ZLB). At the ZLB, capital requirements become less effective in curbing excessive risk-taking incentives, as they disproportionately hurt franchise values. As a consequence, optimal dynamic capital requirements vary with the level of interest rates if the ZLB binds occasionally. Subsidizing bank funding costs at the ZLB dampens risk-taking, but may reduce overall welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Zero lower bound
Search for yield
Capital regulation
Bank competition
Franchise value
JEL: 
G21
G28
E43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.