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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Parigi, Bruno Maria | en |
dc.contributor.author | Pelizzon, Loriana | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19054 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns forcontrolling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able todivert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset returncorrelation affects ownership structure in a positive way. Higher return correlation lowers thebenefits of diversification which causes a higher investment by the controlling shareholder inhis asset and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysissupports the predictions of the model. In particular, controlling for measures of the quality ofthe investor protection, the legal origin of the countries, and other structural variables as in aprevious study by La Porta et al. (1998) we find that equity ownership is significantly moreconcentrated in countries where stock return correlation is higher, and that the magnitude ofthis effect is larger in countries where investor protection is poorer. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1590 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D8 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G3 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corporate governance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | investor protection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | private benefits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | diversification opportunities | en |
dc.subject.stw | Corporate Governance | en |
dc.subject.stw | Eigentümerstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anlegerschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kapitalertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korrelation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Portfolio-Management | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Welt | en |
dc.title | Diversification and ownership concentration | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 503743887 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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