Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/190474 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2017/13
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules do not choose a fixed number of delegates, but instead require different sizes of delegations, depending on the heterogeneity in society. Therefore the resulting delegations are very inclusive, and with t delegates the ratio of individuals whose opinions are not included is always below (0:5)t, following the well-known Zeno's dichotomy. For instance a delegation of size 2 should have at least 75% support from the society and therefore only less than 25% of the opinion pool can be neglected.
Schlagwörter: 
Aggregation Rules
Committee Selection
Conflict Management
Kemeny Distance
Strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C70
D71
ISBN: 
978-615-5594-94-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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