Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18992 
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dc.contributor.authorBreitscheidel, Jörgen
dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:18Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18992-
dc.description.abstractWe explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems inenvironmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems tobe preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-upproblem can always be solved by setting subsidies. Under Bertrand competition, onlyannouncing the tax rate can induce at least one firm to invest. We suggest that feebate systemsin the automotive sector should be designed as self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1528en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelQ28en
dc.subject.jelL50en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordhold-up problemsen
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental regulationen
dc.subject.keywordtaxes and subsidiesen
dc.subject.keywordself-financing mechanismsen
dc.subject.keywordemission controlen
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken
dc.subject.stwUmweltabgabeen
dc.subject.stwSubventionen
dc.subject.stwSteueraufkommenen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwhold-up problemsen
dc.titleSelf-financing environmental mechanisms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500828423en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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