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dc.contributor.authorLengwiler, Yvanen
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952-
dc.description.abstractIn many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We proposea model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder toeither lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibriumbidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, andwhy both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bidrigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimizeillegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1488en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen
dc.subject.keywordprocurementen
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordright of first refusalen
dc.subject.keywordnumerical methodsen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn50046619Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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