Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189471
Authors: 
Dellas, Harris
Nehring, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 98-1
Abstract: 
The main result of this paper characterizes possibly non-symmetric strategy-proof and efficienct choice functions as Perfectly Competitive. Efficiency is defined as impossibility of improvement by reallocation of commodity among finite sets of agents, and largeness of the economy is captured by a weak aggregation-condition called ""local separability."" Individual rationality constraints with respect to an assignment of endowments imply that the resulting allocations must be Walrasian relative to the assignment of endowments. The exact, local approach combined with a normality assumption on the domain of preferences allows the proofs to remain elementary throughout.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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