Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18932 
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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18932-
dc.description.abstractThe fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spendingand indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher itsspending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can bemitigated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between twovariants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they bothdescribe the degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individualdecision-makers. In addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive andlegislation as well as budget rules shape the size of government and how the different rulesinteract with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical study of the role offragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swisscantons over the 1980-1998 period. The results indicate that the number of ministers in thecabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum doeseffectively restrict the fiscal commons problem, but less successfully than the budget rule.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1294en
dc.subject.jelH61en
dc.subject.jelE63en
dc.subject.jelE61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfragmentationen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policyen
dc.subject.keywordreferendumsen
dc.subject.keywordlegislative rulesen
dc.subject.keywordbudget rulesen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwRegierungen
dc.subject.stwRegierungskoalitionen
dc.subject.stwStaatsquoteen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken
dc.subject.stwReferendumen
dc.subject.stwSchweizen
dc.titleDo large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856955043en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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