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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Leininger, Wolfgang | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations haverecently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves anintimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability ofstrategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest -accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show thatany evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game mustalso be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population,any number of mutants can even less do so. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1266 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C79 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Fending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular games | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856884529 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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