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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Delfgaauw, Josse | en |
dc.contributor.author | Dur, Robert | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18862 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experienceswith civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy inwhich workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimalincentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions.When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sectorhighly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort isverifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy'slaziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even thoughcontract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as publicgoods come at a lower cost. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1223 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J4 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M5 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public sector labour markets | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentive contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | work ethics | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public service motivation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentlicher Dienst | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anreizvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsmotivation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsethik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Niederlande | en |
dc.title | Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 85668192X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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