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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:13Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837-
dc.description.abstractIf firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduceasymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a largeshare in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. Asa consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocatedless efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of thefirms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1473en
dc.subject.jelL11en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen
dc.subject.keywordsilent minority shareholdingsen
dc.subject.keywordownership structureen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwStille Gesellschaften
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSilent interests and all-pay auctions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn488944813en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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