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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Blumkin, Tomer | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sadka, Efraim | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1440 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D6 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H2 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | optimal taxation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | re-distribution | en |
dc.subject.keyword | education | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inequality | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schulfinanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Optimale Besteuerung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Einkommensumverteilung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Bildungsverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Bildungsertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | A case for taxing education | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 485162237 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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