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dc.contributor.authorAngelopoulos, Konstantinosen_US
dc.contributor.authorPhilippopoulos, Apostolisen_US
dc.description.abstractIt is known that anti-social redistributive activities (rent seeking, tax evasion, corruption,violation of property rights, delay of socially beneficial reforms, etc) hurt the macroeconomy.But it is less known what is the role of government size as a determinant of such activities.We use data from 64 counties (both developed and developing) in 5-year periods over 1980-2000. As a measure of anti-social activities, we use the ICRG index; as a measure ofgovernment size, we use the government share in GDP; and as a measure of governmentefficiency, we construct an index by following the methodology of Afonso, Schuknecht andTanzi (2003). Our regressions show that what really matters to social incentives is the relationbetween size and efficiency. Specifically, while a larger size of government is bad forincentives when one ignores efficiency, the results change drastically when governmentefficiency is also taken into account. Only when our measure of size exceeds our measure ofefficiency, larger public sectors are bad for incentives. By contrast, when efficiency exceedssize, larger public sectors are not bad; actually, in the case where efficiency is measured bygovernment performance in the policy areas of administration, stabilization and infrastructure,larger public sectors significantly improve incentives.en_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1427en_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment and behaviour of agentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollective decision-makingen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Einflussnahmeen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen_US
dc.titleThe role of government in anti-social redistributive activitiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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