Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/187662
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 9-32
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
We examine the effects of the revised Basel II rules on bank managers' discretionary behavior, specifically income smoothing and loan loss provisioning. As the revised rules exert greater regulatory pressure on corporate than retail banking, we predict corporate bank managers to reduce risk-taking activities or increase income smoothing. Analysis of segmental reports reveals greater (less) income smoothing in the corporate banking segments of low-capital (high-capital) banks during the Basel II period, with their managers recognizing loan loss provisions in a less timely fashion. We find no such effects for retail banking. Although we document an initially negative market reaction to the regulatory announcements, that reaction weakens over time. Overall, the study highlights the unintended consequences of the banking rule changes.
Subjects: 
Basel Accord
Income smoothing
Loan loss provisions
Corporate banking
Retail banking
JEL: 
M41
M48
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.