Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187622 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 179-201
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This study systematically examines the ability of aggregate insider trading to predict future market returns in the Chinese A-share market. After controlling for the contrarian investment strategy, aggregate executive (large shareholder) trading conducted over the past six months can predict 66% (72.7%) of market returns twelve months in advance. Aggregate insider trading predicts future market returns very accurately and is stronger for insiders who have a greater information advantage (e.g., executives and controlling shareholders). Corporate governance also affects the predictability of insider trading. The predictability of executive trading is weakest in central state-owned companies, probably because the 'quasi-official' status of the executives in those companies effectively curbs their incentives to benefit from insider trading. The predictive power of large shareholder trading in private-owned companies is higher than that in state-owned companies, probably due to their stronger profit motivation and higher involvement in business operations. This study complements the literature by examining an emerging market and investigating how the institutional context and corporate governance affect insider trading.
Subjects: 
Aggregate insider trading
Large shareholder trading
Information hierarchy
Corporate governance
Emerging market
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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