Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187599 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 101-118
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships, board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market. Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.
Subjects: 
Network
Independent director
Tunneling
Social network analysis
JEL: 
G30
L14
M00
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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