Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18717 
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dc.contributor.authorGovernatori, Matteoen
dc.contributor.authorEijffinger, Sylvester C. W.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:23Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18717-
dc.description.abstractThe paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency union withdecentralised national fiscal policy, where the main features characterising the policy-makingare similar to those in EMU. National governments choose the size of deficit taking intoaccount the two main rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on public finance. Unlikeprevious literature the asymmetric working of those rules is explicitly modelled in order toidentify its impact on the Nash equilibrium of deficits arising from a game of strategicinteraction between fiscal authorities in the union.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1354en
dc.subject.jelH7en
dc.subject.jelH3en
dc.subject.jelE61en
dc.subject.jelH6en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordStability and Growth Pacten
dc.subject.keywordEMUen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric fiscal rulesen
dc.subject.keyworddecentralised fiscal policyen
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen
dc.subject.stwEU-Stabilitätspakten
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleFiscal and monetary interaction : the role of asymmetries of the stability and growth pact in EMU-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477478794en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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