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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Strand, Jon | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:52:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:52:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18714 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measuredalternatively by household member i's willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of thehousehold, WTPi(H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members,WTP(C). Households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient Nash bargains overprivate and common household goods. WTPi(H) is then found by trading off the public goodagainst household goods, and WTP(C) by trading the public good off against private goods. Ithen find that WTPi(H) is higher (lower) when member i has a high (low) marginal valuationof the public good, but on average represents WTP(C) correctly. Individuals then tend torepresent households correctly on average when questioned about the household's WTP for apublic good, even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully. Counting all members?WTP answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting. Pure and paternalisticaltruism (the latter attached to consumption of the public good) move each member's WTP onbehalf of the household closer to the true aggregate WTP, but only the latter raises aggregateWTP. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1351 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q26 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | willingness to pay | en |
dc.subject.keyword | contingent valuation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | intrafamily allocation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Nash bargaining | en |
dc.subject.stw | Willingness to pay | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Familie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Public-good valuation and intrafamily allocation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 477504620 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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