Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690 
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dc.contributor.authorLi, Jianpeien
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:12Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18690-
dc.description.abstractWe study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnershipsform in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities mayarise that make partners? skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatiblepartnership contract that can be implemented by a simple call option, and then analyze thecommonly used buy'sell provision. We show that this dissolution rule gives rise toinefficiency, either in the form of excessive dissolutions combined with underinvestment orefficient dissolutions combined with overinvestment. However, supplementing the buy'sellprovision with the right to veto may restore efficiency.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1325en
dc.subject.jelL24en
dc.subject.jelJ12en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwPartnerschaftsgesellschaften
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwRealoptionen
dc.subject.stwQualifikationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePartnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477404790en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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