Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185882
Authors: 
Dietl, Helmut M.
Grütter, Andreas
Lutzenberger, Martin
Felisberto, Catia
Finger, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics [ISSN:] 2235-6282 [Volume:] 144 [Year:] 2008 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 37-55
Abstract: 
We develop an industry specific model of price competition with product differentiation to analyze the effect of entry regulation on process innovation in the Swiss mail industry. We consider the four most prominent scenarios: regulated monopoly, end-to-end competition, worksharing without bypass, and worksharing with bypass. Based on model calibration with data from the Swiss letter market, we find that the incentives to invest in process innovation decrease with deregulation. However, even accounting for this fact, the efficiency gains from partial liberalization, i.e. worksharing, ensure an increase in social welfare.
Subjects: 
end-to-end competition
entry regulation
mail industry
process innovation
worksharing
JEL: 
L51
L87
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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