Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185715
Authors: 
Strausz, Roland
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 45
Abstract: 
In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation principle holds if allocations are modelled as the Cartesian product of outcomes and verifiable information, giving rise to evidence-contingent mechanisms. Consequently, incentive constraints characterize the implementable set. The revelation principle does not hold when an allocation is modelled as only an outcome so that mechanisms are non-contingent. Yet, any outcome implementable by an evidence-contingent mechanism is implementable by a non-contingent mechanism, provided it can both extend and restrict reporting information. A type-independent bad outcome implies the latter property.
Subjects: 
revelation principle
mechanism design
verifiable information
JEL: 
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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