Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185708 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 38
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium outcomes for any given preference profile, and (ii) the set of preference profiles for which equilibrium is unique. Based on this characterization, I establish that a weak notion of present bias - implied, e.g., by any hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting - is sufficient for equilibrium to be unique, stationary and efficient. Conversely, I demonstrate how certain violations of present bias give rise to multiple (non-stationary) equilibria that feature delayed agreement under gradually increasing offers.
Schlagwörter: 
time preferences
dynamic inconsistency
alternating offers
bargaining
optimal punishments
delay
JEL: 
C78
D03
D74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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