Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185608
Authors: 
van den Brink, Rene
Levinsky, Rene
Zeleny, Miroslav
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2018-089/II
Abstract: 
Moulin (1987) studies the equal and proportional sharing rule for a special class of cooperative games that he calls joint venture games. Proportionality is an important principle in allocation problems. Besides some special cases, it is not obvious how proportionality should be applied in cooperative TU-games. Such special cases, where proportionality is obvious, are inessential games and cooperative joint venture games. In this paper, we discuss an explicit axiom that shows that proper Shapley values can be seen as an appropriate way to express proportionality in value allocation in cooperative TU-games. We characterize positive proper Shapley values by affine invariance and an axiom that requires proportional allocation according to the individual singleton worths in generalized joint venture games. As a counterpart, we show that affine invariance and an axiom that requires equal allocation of the surplus in generalized joint venture games, characterize the positive part of the Shapley value among the single-valued solutions.
Subjects: 
Equity principle
Cooperative venture game
Shapley value
proper Shapley value
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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