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Autoren: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Thum, Marcel
Datum: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7305
Zusammenfassung: 
In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be more likely to be successful than gradual/sequential negotiation approaches and compare different routes of sequential bargaining. Under plausible conditions, full-scale global coordination is least likely to emerge if the negotiations take place sequentially, and if the negotiations with the most unpredictable country take place last.
Schlagwörter: 
tax competition
tax cooperation
multilateral negotiations
sequential negotiations
ultimatum bargaining
acceptance uncertainty
JEL: 
H25
H77
F52
F55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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