Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/184875
Authors: 
Beckmann, Klaus B.
Dewenter, Ralf
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapier No. 178
Publisher: 
Helmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, Hamburg
Abstract: 
The present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically symmetric. Two examples are used to illustrate the application of the heuristic in differential games.
Subjects: 
differential games
simulation
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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