Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/183475
Authors: 
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Ritzberger, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IHS Economics Series 332
Abstract: 
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), arbitrary specifications of patience or impatience (geometric, hyperbolic, or otherwise), externalities, multiple selves, and other-regarding preferences.
Subjects: 
bargaining
equilibrium existence
infinite-horizon games
subgame perfection
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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