Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/183271
Authors: 
Doganoglu, Toker
Inceoglu, Firat
Muthers, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 1812
Abstract: 
We introduce a fairly general licensing model with an endogenous industry structure - in terms of number of active firms - and general licensing contracts. We show that when the patentee can employ contracts that can condition on market entry or price, it can implement an outcome that yields monopoly profits by awarding the license to a single firm. Furthermore, when the patentee can only use contracts based on the quantities of the licensees, it still captures the entire market via a single licensee, albeit not at the monopoly price. Commonly assumed two-part tariff contracts cannot duplicate this last outcome and yield lower profits. We discuss the welfare implications of various contractual schemes.
Subjects: 
Patent licensing
free entry
quantity competition
JEL: 
D45
K11
L11
L13
L21
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
355.49 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.