Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181561
Authors: 
Kurz, Sascha
Mayer, Alexander
Napel, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Voting II G03-V1
Abstract: 
Players in a committee, council, or electoral college often wield asymmetric numbers of votes. Binary decision environments are then conventionally modeled as weighted voting games. We introduce weighted committee games in order to describe decisions on three or more alternatives in similarly succinct fashion. We compare different voting weight configurations for plurality, Borda, Copeland, and antiplurality rule. The respective geometries and very different numbers of structurally non-equivalent committees have escaped notice so far. They determine voting equilibria, the distribution of power, and other aspects of collective choice.
Subjects: 
voting games
weighted voting
geometry of voting
voting power
Borda rule
Copeland rule
plurality
antiplurality
JEL: 
C71
D71
C63
Document Type: 
Conference Paper
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