Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/180599 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11581
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted towards more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products.
Subjects: 
incentives
subjective performance evaluation
multitasking
field experiment
bank
JEL: 
M52
J33
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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