Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179365 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 18-02
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing the service, but some individuals are better suited for the task than others. The optimal mechanism is a threshold rule that assigns the task randomly among volunteers if enough volunteers come forward, and otherwise assigns the task among the non-volunteers.
Schlagwörter: 
Volunteering
public good provision
mechanism design
JEL: 
D82
D71
D62
H41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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