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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 049.2017
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate Policy Instruments
Intertemporal Cooperation
Climate Game
Experiments
JEL: 
C91
D62
D99
Q38
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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