Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/176028 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Texto para discussão No. 545
Verlag: 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia, Rio de Janeiro
Zusammenfassung: 
In infinite horizon incomplete market economies, Ponzi schemes are avoided and equilibrium exists when collateral repossession is the only mechanism enforcing borrowers not to entirely default on their promises. In these economies, we add default enforcement mechanisms that are effective, i.e. induce payments besides the value of collateral guarantees. We prove that, independently of prices, the individual’s problem does not have a physically feasible solution when collateral guarantees are not large enough relative to the effectiveness of the additional enforcement mechanisms. We also show that this result does not depend on specific types of such mechanisms, as long as they are effective.
Schlagwörter: 
Effective default enforcements
Collateral repossession
Individual’s optimality.
JEL: 
D50
D52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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