Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175871
Authors: 
Schopohl, Simon
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 570
Abstract: 
We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according to the value of information, the player can also get an additional reward if he is the last player to pass. Facing this problem while discounting over time determines the player's behavior. Once a successor has collected all information from his workers he starts to play the same game with his successor. We state conditions for different Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it takes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to compare different structures and state which structure centralizes fastest depending on the information distribution and other parameters. We show that the time the centralization takes is mostly affected by the least informed players.
Subjects: 
communication network
dynamic network game
hierarchical structure
information transmission
JEL: 
D83
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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