Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175559
Authors: 
Keser, Claudia
Müller, Stephan
Peterlé, Emmanuel
Rau, Holger A.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
cege Discussion Papers 341
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects' competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The results show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since they make lower offers, which are more often rejected. Similarly, highly competitive responders achieve lower payoffs, since they request excessive amounts which induces lower proposals. These findings establish a link between competitiveness and bargaining as suggested by social and evolutionary psychology. Thus, we identify one driver of the empirical heterogeneity of bargaining behavior and outcomes. From a management perspective our findings highlight that giving thought to employees' competitiveness before delegating them to participate in negotiations may pay off.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Competitiveness
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
M54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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