Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175345
Authors: 
Apolte, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CIW Discussion Paper No. 1/2018
Abstract: 
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions of self-enforcing democracy by analyzing the recent wave of autocratic transitions. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we work out the conditions under which governments may induce the diverse public authorities to coordinate on extra-constitutional activities, eventually transforming the politico-institutional setting into one of autocratic rule. We find three empirically testable characteristics that promote this coordination process, namely: populism and public support, corruption, and a lack in the separation of powers. By contrast, low degrees of corruption and strongly separated powers can be viewed as prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy.
JEL: 
D02
D72
D74
P48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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