Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175267
Authors: 
Müller, Stephan
Rau, Holger A.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
cege Discussion Papers 338
Abstract: 
This paper tests motivational crowding out in the domain of charitable giving. A novelty is that our experiment isolates alternative explanations for the decline of giving such as strategic considerations of decision makers. Moreover, preference elicitation allows us to focus on the reaction of donors characterized by different degrees of intrinsic motivation. In the charitable-giving setting subjects donate money to the German "Red Cross" in two consecutive stages. The first dictator game is modified, i.e., donors face with equal probability an ex post reimbursement or a subsequent pay. The second game is a standard dictator game where we control for the decline of giving. We find that subjects with a high degree of intrinsic motivation, who received a reimbursement, reduce their donations more than four times as much as equally motivated individuals who did not experience a payment.
Subjects: 
Altruism
Dictator Game
Experiment
Motivational Crowd Out
JEL: 
D02
D03
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
910.18 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.