Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174404
Authors: 
López-Pintado, Dunia
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 2016-12
Abstract: 
We consider a model of local public goods in a random network context. The influence network determines (exogenously) who observes whom every period and comprises a wide array of options depending on the degree distribution and the in/out-degree correlations. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium level of public good provision and compare it with the efficient level. We derive further insights for this problem by performing a comparative statics analysis.
Subjects: 
influence networks
public goods
out-degree
in-degree
best-shot game
JEL: 
D85
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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