Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174335
Authors: 
Rusch, Hannes
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 39-2017
Abstract: 
A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D;D) to (C;C). The present paper complements previous work on collaboration by expanding on its genericity: conditions for the evolutionary viability and stability of collaboration under fairly undemanding assumptions about population and interaction structure are derived. Doing so, this paper shows that collaboration is an adaptive principle of strategy choice in a broad range of niches, i.e., stochastic mixtures of games.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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