Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173760
Authors: 
Dennis, Richard
Ilbas, Pelin
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
NBB Working Paper 304
Abstract: 
We use the two-country model of the euro area developed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) to study policymaking in the European Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, we focus on strategic interactions: 1) between monetary policy and a common macroprudential authority, and; 2) between an EMU-level monetary authority and regional macroprudential authorities. In the first case, price stability and financial stability are pursued at the EMU level, while in the second case each macroprudential authority adopts region-specific objectives. We compare cooperative equilibria in the simultaneous-move and leadership solutions, each obtained assuming policy discretion. Further, we assess the effects on policy performance of assigning shared objectives across policymakers and of altering the level of importance attached to various policy objectives.
Subjects: 
Monetary policy
macroprudential policy
policy coordination
JEL: 
E42
E44
E52
E58
E61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
400.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.