Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171660 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 15/217
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper derives general rules for equitable burden sharing in international climate policy. The focus is on a new social climate contract between developed and less developed countries (LDCs) which preserves competitiveness of the former and the ”right to development” of the latter. We formally derive conditions under which an LDC keeps the ”right to development” but voluntarily agrees to participate in stringent international climate policy. Two types of policies are analyzed, one with a predefined transfer and the other with a transfer that is tied to emissions-control efforts. We show that offering only one or the other option is inefficient. Chances for a comprehensive agreement are higher when a menu of policy options is available. The number and diversity of LDCs willing to join a global climate treaty is higher when a variety of policy alternatives is available.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate policy
less developed countries
equitable burden sharing
right to development
international climate agreement
JEL: 
Q43
O47
Q56
O41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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