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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 12/157
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper suggests a new explanation for the low level of annuitization, which is valid even if one assumes perfect markets. We show that, as soon there exists a positive bequest motive, sufficiently risk averse individuals should not purchase annuities. A model calibration accounting for temporal risk aversion generates a willingness-to-pay for annuities, which is significantly smaller than the one generated by a standard Yaari (1965) model. Moreover, the calibration predicts that riskless savings finances one third of consumption, in line with empirical findings.
Schlagwörter: 
annuity puzzle
insurance demand
bequest
intergenerational transfers
temporal risk aversion
multiplicative preferences
JEL: 
D11
D81
D91
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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