Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171586
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 11/143
Abstract: 
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
Subjects: 
elections
campaign contributions
interest groups
JEL: 
C72
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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