Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171579 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 10/136
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect. As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large. For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decisionmaking is to appoint a devil’s advocate.
Schlagwörter: 
experts
committees
career concerns
verifiable information
information aggregation
JEL: 
D71
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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