Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171535 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 08/92
Publisher: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Abstract: 
In a standard partial equilibrium model of resource depletion, this paper charac- terizes and examines the solution to the optimal taxation problem when extraction is monopolistic. The main result is that the family of subgame perfect effciency- inducing tax/subsidy schemes may include some strict tax policies. This illustrates how the static trade-off between inducing effciency and raising tax revenues in the presence of market power is relaxed under exhaustibility.
Subjects: 
Exhaustible resources
Imperfect competition
Optimal taxation
JEL: 
Q30
L12
H21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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