Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171509 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 07/66
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
In economic discussions, currency board systems are frequently described as arrangements with self-binding character to the monetary authorities by their strict rules and establishments by law. Hard pegs and especially currency boards are often seen as remedies to overcome economic and financial turmoils and to return to low inflation. A sustainable debt level closely linked to a disciplined fiscal policy is, however, a premise for medium-term success. We show in a two-period model that the choice of a currency board can increase fiscal discipline compared to a standard peg regime. We derive, furthermore, the conditions for a currency boards to gain a stability advantage compared to a common peg system.
Schlagwörter: 
currency board
fixed exchange rate
commitment
inflation bias
fiscal discipline
public debt
time-inconsistency problem
JEL: 
E52
E58
E62
F33
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.07 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.