Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171368 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2015-304r2
Versionsangabe: 
June 2015 (2nd revision November 2017)
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent behavioral models argue in favor of avoidance of instrumental information. We explore the role of information avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance of instrumental information exist, studying information structures on performance pay. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, the findings support theories on information avoidance that favor an optimistic belief design rather than theories that rationalize such behavior as a way to mitigate selfcontrol problems. This suggests that coarse information structures lead agents to distort their beliefs away from the objective prior.
Schlagwörter: 
optimal expectations
belief design
performance
real effort task
coarse incentive structures
workplace incentives
JEL: 
D83
D84
J31
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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