Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171243
Authors: 
Cerqueti, Roy
Sabatini, Fabio
Ventura, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2017
Abstract: 
We model how the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers' support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.
Subjects: 
welfare state
redistribution
tax surveillance
trust
civic capital
social capital
Document Type: 
Preprint

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