Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171022 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11038
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Using a simple theoretical model we conjecture that dual practice may increase the number of patients seen but reduce hours spent at public facilities, if public physicians lack motivation and/or if their opportunity costs are very large. Using data from Indonesia, we then test these theoretical conjectures. Our identification strategy relies on a 1997 legislation necessitating health professionals to apply for license for private practice only after three years of graduation. Results using a difference-in-difference regression discontinuity design provides support to our conjectures, identifying the role of weak work discipline, lack of motivation and opportunity costs of public service provision.
Subjects: 
dual practice of health professionals
Ministry of Health Regulation
weak monitoring
motivation
opportunity costs of public service
Indonesia
JEL: 
I10
I18
J2
J44
J45
O1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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