Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170865
Authors: 
Dasgupta, Indraneel
Neogi, Ranajoy Guha
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10881
Abstract: 
We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot coordinate with one another. All sub-groups choose effort allocations simultaneously. We find that aggregate rent-seeking rises, social welfare falls, and both communities are worse off when the dominant sub-groups within both communities increase their population shares relative to the respective average sub-group population. Any unilateral increase in fragmentation within a group reduces conflict and makes its opponent better off. The fragmenting community itself may however be better off as well, even though its share of the public good falls. Thus, a reduced share of public good provisioning cannot be used to infer a negative welfare implication for the losing community.
Subjects: 
contest
group-specific public good
local public good
ethnic conflict
within-group fragmentation
JEL: 
D72
D74
O10
O20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
529.79 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.