Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170811
Authors: 
Coles, Melvyn
Francesconi, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 10827
Abstract: 
This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where ex-ante heterogenous individuals have general payoff functions and vectors of attributes. The analysis applies to a large class of models, from the non-transferable utility case to the collective household case with bargaining. The approach is powerful for it identifies a simple algorithm which, in the empirical application, is found to rapidly converge to equilibrium. Using indirect inference, we identify the differential effects of women's ability and charm on female match incentives. We use these results to assess the separate impacts of the arrival of equal opportunities for women in the labor market and the advent of the contraceptive pill on female economic activity and matching.
Subjects: 
female labor supply
marriage
multiple attribute matching
two-sided search
contraceptive pill
JEL: 
C6
J0
J1
N3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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