Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170693
Authors: 
Schories, Fanny E.
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series 9
Abstract: 
This paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected parties rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design is able to control for selection effects arising from the democratic policy choice. I find evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously implemented institutions lead to more cooperation than iden- tical exogenous institutions. Especially the subjects who initially did not prefer the policy comply if it was brought about by an elected representative. The results have implications for the analysis of decision-making processes and policy recommendations in general.
Subjects: 
Laboratory Experiment
Representative Democracy
Collective Decision-Making
Social Dilemma
Legitimacy
JEL: 
C9
D02
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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